Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe: empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK

Isabelle Dherment-Ferere (), Jens Köke and Luc Renneboog

No 01-24, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This study examines managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms using large panels for Belgian, French, German and UK firms. We consider the monitoring role of large blockholders, the market for share blocks, creditors, and non-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France and the UK. Large boards facilitate disciplining, but the role of non-executives is ambiguous.

Keywords: corporate governance; managerial disciplining; ownership structure; CEO succession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5379

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