Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet and Francesco Ricci

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, issue 132, 81-103

Abstract: We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction. JEL Codes: Q31, D82. Keywords: Non-Renewable Resource Management, Delegated Management, Optimal Contract, Asymmetric Information.

Keywords: Non-Renewable Resource Management; Delegated Management; Optimal Contract; Asymmetric Information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 Q31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks (2018)
Working Paper: Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2018:i:132:p:81-103

DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().