Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet and Francesco Ricci

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.

Keywords: Non-Renewable Resource Management; Delegated Management; Optimal Contract; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02057380v1
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Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, 132, pp.81. ⟨10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks (2018)
Working Paper: Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-02057380

DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081

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