Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks
David Martimort (),
Jerome Pouyet and
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We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.
Keywords: Non-Renewable Resource Management; Delegated Management; Optimal Contract; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, CNGP-INSEE, 2018, pp.81
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Journal Article: Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02057380
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