Early Admissions at Selective Colleges

Christopher Avery and Jonathan Levin

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 5, 2125-56

Abstract: Early admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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Working Paper: Early Admissions at Selective Colleges (2009)
Working Paper: Early Admission at Selective Colleges (2009)
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