Early Admission at Selective Colleges

Christopher Avery and Jonathan Levin
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Christopher Avery: Harvard University

Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.

Keywords: Game Theory; Early Admission; Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
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http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/08-031.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Early Admissions at Selective Colleges (2010)
Working Paper: Early Admissions at Selective Colleges (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sip:dpaper:08-031

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