Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
Christopher Avery and
No 14844, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.
JEL-codes: C78 D82 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as Christopher Avery & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Early Admissions at Selective Colleges," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2125-56, December.
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