Using Artefactual Field Experiments to Learn about the Incentives for Sustainable Forest Use in Developing Economies

Maarten Voors (), Erwin Bulte, Andreas Kontoleon, John List and Ty Turley

American Economic Review, 2011, vol. 101, issue 3, 329-33

Abstract: We implement a public goods game and a social intervention modeled after a public goods game in rural Sierra Leone near the Gola Forest Reserve. We also collect demographic, economic and forest conservation data on households in the area. We use this data to assess the mapping of social preferences from the artefactual field experiment (AFE) into real world behavior. We find evidence of heterogeneity in shifting factors between the AFE, the field experiment, and conservation outcomes. We also find evidence that social controls like war violence and witchcraft may explain some of this correlation.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Using artefactual field experiments to learn about the incentives for sustainable forest use in developing economies (2011)
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