Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Petra Moser and Alessandra Voena

American Economic Review, 2012, vol. 102, issue 1, 396-427

Abstract: Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 130,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent. (JEL D45, L24, N42, O31, O34)

Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (190)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (2010)
Working Paper: Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (2009)
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