Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act
Petra Moser and
No 15598, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.
JEL-codes: N32 N42 O1 O12 O2 O3 O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2012. "Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 396-427, February.
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Journal Article: Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (2012)
Working Paper: Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (2010)
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