Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Petra Moser and Alessandra Voena

No 09-026, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 130,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent

Keywords: Compulsory Licensing; patents; developing countries; Trading with the Enemy Act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/09-026.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (2012)
Working Paper: Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sip:dpaper:09-026

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Shor ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).