On the Selection of Arbitrators

Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz and Brian Knight

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 11, 3434-58

Abstract: A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for con icting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank, a simultaneous procedure that is commonly used in practice, and develop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the short-lising procedure.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.11.3434
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2014)
Working Paper: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2012)
Working Paper: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2011)
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