On the Selection of Arbitrators

Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz and Brian Knight

No 2012-8, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conflicting parties to partake in the selection of the person who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. Theoretical, empirical and experimental arguments are combined to highlight difficulties with a procedure that is commonly used in practice and to develop and identify better performing procedures.

Keywords: # (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.brown.edu/sites/g/files/dprerj72 ... ers/2012-8_paper.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2014)
Working Paper: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2014)
Working Paper: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bro:econwp:2012-8

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brown Economics Webmaster ().