On the Selection of Arbitrators

Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz and Brian Knight

No 275829, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for con icting par- ties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank, a simultaneous procedure that is commonly used in practice, and develop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better proper- ties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical pre- dictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the short- lising procedure.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2014)
Working Paper: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2012)
Working Paper: On the Selection of Arbitrators (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275829

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275829

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