Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters

Jesse Rothstein

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 1, 100-130

Abstract: Teacher contracts that condition pay and retention on demonstrated performance can improve selection into and out of teaching. I study alternative contracts in a simulated teacher labor market that incorporates dynamic self-selection and Bayesian learning. Bonus policies create only modest incentives and thus have small effects on selection. Reductions in tenure rates can have larger effects, but must be accompanied by substantial salary increases; elimination of tenure confers little additional benefit unless firing rates are extremely high. Benefits of both bonus and tenure policies exceed costs, though optimal policies are sensitive to labor market parameters about which little is known. (JEL I21, J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J45)

JEL-codes: I21 J22 J23 J24 J31 J41 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20121242
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
Working Paper: Teacher quality policy when supply matters (2012)
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
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