Teacher quality policy when supply matters

Jesse Rothstein

No 2012/35, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: Recent proposals would strengthen the dependence of teacher pay and retention on performance, in order to attract those who will be effective teachers and repel those who will not. I model the teacher labor market, incorporating dynamic self-selection, noisy performance measurement, and Bayesian learning. Simulations indicate that labor market interactions are important to the evaluation of alternative teacher contracts. Typical bonus policies have very small effects on selection. Firing policies can have larger effects, if accompanied by substantial salary increases. However, misalignment between productivity and measured performance nearly eliminates the benefits while preserving most of the costs.

Keywords: Teacher quality; pay-for-performance; labor supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2015)
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
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