 Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College AdmissionsGabrielle Fack, Julien Grenet and YingHua He American Economic Review, 2019, vol. 109, issue 4, 1486-1529 Abstract: We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings. JEL-codes: D11 D12 D82 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:4:p:1486-1529 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC. |
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