Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

Fack, Gabrielle; Grenet, Julien; He, YingHua

Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

Gabrielle Fack, Julien Grenet and YingHua He

No 15-607, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with data from centralized matching mechanisms, like the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance, when students are strictly ranked by, e.g., test scores. Without requiring truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, we show that the matching is (asymptotically) stable, or justified-envy-free, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she is qualified for ex post. Having illustrated the approaches in simulations, we apply them to school choice data from Paris and demonstrate evidence supporting stability but not truth-telling. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.

Keywords: Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism; School Choice; Stable Matching; Student Preferences; Admission Criteria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D50 D61 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10, Revised 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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