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Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

Gabrielle Fack, Julien Grenet () and Yinghua He

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with data from centralized matching mechanisms, like the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance, when students are strictly ranked by, e.g., test scores. Without requiring truthtelling to be the unique equilibrium, we show that the matching is (asymptotically) stable, or justified-envy-free, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she is qualified for ex post. Having illustrated the approaches in simulations, we apply them to school choice data from Paris and demonstrate evidence supporting stability but not truth-telling. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.

Keywords: Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism; School Choice; Stable Matching; Student Preferences; Admission Criteria; College Admissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm, nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-ure
Date: 2017-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01215998v3
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Journal Article: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019)
Working Paper: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2017) Downloads
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