Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro Vicente and Inês Vilela

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 11, 3431-53

Abstract: Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.

JEL-codes: C73 D72 D74 O13 O17 Q33 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique (2019)
Working Paper: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique (2019)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190842

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