Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente,Inês Vilela
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts and Pedro C. Vicente

No 01/2019, NCID Working Papers from Navarra Center for International Development, University of Navarra

Abstract: The political resource curse is the idea that natural resources can lead to the deterioration of public policies through corruption and rent-seeking by those closest to political power. One prominent consequence is the emergence of conflict. This paper takes this theory to the data for the case of Mozambique, where a substantial discovery of natural gas recently took place. Focusing on the anticipation of a resource boom and the behavior of local political structures and communities, a large-scale field experiment was designed and implemented to follow the dissemination of information about the newly-discovered resources. Two types of treatments provided variation in the degree of dissemination: one with information targeting only local political leaders, the other with information and deliberation activities targeting communities at large. A wide variety of theory-driven outcomes is measured through surveys, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and georeferenced administrative data about local con- flict. Information given only to leaders increases elite capture and rent-seeking, while infor- mation and deliberation targeted at citizens increases mobilization and accountability-related outcomes, and decreases violence. While the political resource curse is likely to be in play, the dissemination of information to communities at large has a countervailing effect.

Keywords: Natural Resources; Curse; Natural Gas; Information; Deliberation; Rent-seeking; Mozambique. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O13 O55 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique (2020)
Working Paper: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique (2019)
Working Paper: Does information break the political resource curse? Experimental evidence from Mozambique (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nva:unnvaa:wp01-2019

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