Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro Vicente and Inês Vilela ()

No W19/01, IFS Working Papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract: The political resource curse is the idea that natural resources can lead to the deterioration of public policies through corruption and rent-seeking by those closest to political power. One prominent consequence is the emergence of conflict. This paper takes this theory to the data for the case of Mozambique, where a substantial discovery of natural gas recently took place. Focusing on the anticipation of a resource boom and the behavior of local political structures and communities, a large-scale field experiment was designed and implemented to follow the dissemination of information about the newly-discovered resources. Two types of treatments provided variation in the degree of dissemination: one with information targeting only local political leaders, the other with information and deliberation activities targeting communities at large. A wide variety of theory-driven outcomes is measured through surveys, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and georeferenced administrative data about local conflict. Information given only to leaders increases elite capture and rent-seeking, while information and deliberation targeted at citizens increases mobilization and accountability-related outcomes, and decreases violence. While the political resource curse is likely to be in play, the dissemination of information to communities at large has a countervailing effect.

Date: 2019-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-ene and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique (2020)
Working Paper: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique (2019)
Working Paper: Does information break the political resource curse? Experimental evidence from Mozambique (2019)
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