The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

American Economic Review, 1995, vol. 85, issue 4, 667-90

Abstract: Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free-trade agreement. Will a free-trade agreement between these countries be politically viable and, if so, what form will it take? The authors address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry special-interest groups and an incumbent government. They describe the economic conditions necessary for a free-trade agreement to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and for the case when a few politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreements. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (289)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%2819950 ... O%3B2-3&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1994)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:4:p:667-90

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().