The Politics of Free Trade Agreements

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

No 908, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA). Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable? If so, what form will it take? We address these questions using a political economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry special interest groups and an incumbent government. We describe the economic conditions necessary for an FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and when a few, politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreement.

Keywords: Free Trade Agreement; Political Economy; Regional Integration; Trade Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements (1995)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
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