The Politics of Free Trade Agreements

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

No 4597, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA). Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable? And if so, what form will it take? We address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry special interest groups and an incumbent government. We describe the economic conditions necessary for an FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and when a few, politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreement.

JEL-codes: F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-12
Note: ITI
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published as American Economic Review, vol. 85, 1995, pp. 667-690

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements (1995)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1994)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
Working Paper: The Politics of Free Trade Agreements (1993)
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