Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example

Benjamin Hermalin

American Economic Review, 1998, vol. 88, issue 5, 1188-1206

Abstract: This paper explores leadership within organizations. Leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary, rather than coerced, activity of the followers. This paper considers how a leader induces rational agents to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead them. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example (1997)
Working Paper: Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example (1996)
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