Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example

Benjamin Hermalin

Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business

Abstract: This paper explores leadership within organizations. Leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntarty rather than coerced activity of the followers. This paper considers how a leader induces rational followers to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead her followers.

Date: 1996-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example (1998)
Working Paper: Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:calbha:_006

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