Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example

Benjamin Hermalin

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper explores leadership within organizations. Leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary rather than coerced activity of the followers. This paper considers how a leader induces rational followers to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead her followers.

Keywords: leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 D29 L29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1997-01-14
Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on IBM PC; to print on Postscript; pages: 38 ; figures: none
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/9612/9612002.ps.gz (application/postscript)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/9612/9612002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example (1998)
Working Paper: Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9612002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).