Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment
Cesar Martinelli (),
Susan Parker (),
Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea and
Rodimiro Rodrigo ()
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2018, vol. 10, issue 1, 298-325
We use a database generated by a policy intervention that incentivized learning as measured by standardized exams to investigate empirically the relationship between cheating by students and cash incentives to students and teachers. We adapt methods from the education measurement literature to calculate the extent of cheating and show that cheating is more prevalent under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students (versus no incentives or incentives only to teachers). We provide evidence suggesting that students may have learned to cheat, with the number of cheating students per classroom increasing over time under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students.
JEL-codes: D83 I21 I28 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150066
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Working Paper: Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:10:y:2018:i:1:p:298-325
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