Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment
Cesar Martinelli (),
Susan Parker (),
Ana Cristina PeÌ rez-Gea () and
Rodimiro Rodrigo ()
Additional contact information
Ana Cristina PeÌ rez-Gea: Instituto TecnolÃ³gico AutÃ³nomo de MÃ©xico (ITAM)
No 1058, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science
We use a database generated by a policy intervention that incentivized learning as measured by standardized exams to investigate empirically the relationship between cheating by students and cash incentives to students and teachers. We adapt methods from the education measurement literature to calculate the extent of cheating, and show that cheating is more prevalent under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students (versus no incentives, or incentives only to teachers), both in the sense of a larger number of cheating students per classroom and in the sense of more cheating relations per classroom. We also provide evidence of learning to cheat, with both the number of cheating students per classroom and the average number of cheating relations increasing over the years under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-edu, nep-exp and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Journal Article: Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1058
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stan Tsirulnikov ().