Dodging Trade Sanctions? Evidence from Military Goods

Lisa Scheckenhofer, Feodora A. Teti and Joschka Wanner

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2025, vol. 115, 573-77

Abstract: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to unprecedented sanctions aimed at denying Russia access to critical technologies essential for sustaining its war efforts. This paper examines whether trade sanctions targeting military goods were undermined by evasion, specifically through transshipment via Russia-friendly countries. We find that Russia-friendly countries were 20 percentage points more likely to export military goods to Russia relative to neutral countries after the war began, while exports of military goods from Western allies to these countries also increased. Our results show that weak enforcement significantly undermines the effectiveness of sanctions.

JEL-codes: D74 F13 F14 F51 L64 P26 P33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20251084

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