Dodging Trade Sanctions? Evidence from Military Goods

Lisa Scheckenhofer, Feodora A. Teti, Joschka Wanner, Feodora Teti () and Feodora Teti ()

No 11743, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to unprecedented sanctions aimed at denying Russia access to critical technologies essential for sustaining its war efforts. This paper examines whether trade sanctions targeting military goods were undermined by evasion, specifically through transshipment through Russia-friendly countries. We find that Russia-friendly countries are 20 pp more likely to export military goods to Russia relative to neutral countries after the war began, while exports of military goods from Western allies to these countries also increased. Our results show that weak enforcement significantly undermines the effectiveness of sanctions.

Keywords: trade sanctions; sanction evasion; military goods trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F14 F51 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11743

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