Incentive Provision and Coordination Costs in Food-Marketing Channels: A Multi-Stage Channel-Agency Theory Perspective

John Kuwornu (), W. Erno Kuiper, Joost Pennings () and Matthew T.G. Meulenberg

Journal of Food Distribution Research, 2005, vol. 36, issue 01, 6

Abstract: Food-supply chains have become extensively vertically coordinated through the use of contracts as an organizational response to satisfy the needs of consumers in the saturated food markets of the industrialized countries. The contracts involved must establish an optimal trade-off between incentive provision and risk reduction. Agency theory can be used to model this trade-off. We show how to do this in a three-stage (producer, wholesaler, retailer) principal-agent supply-chain model. Its application to the Dutch supply chain of ware potatoes shows that during the period 1961-2002, retailers have been able to provide more incentives to the wholesalers and producers and as a consequence the costs of coordination in the supply chain decreased.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/26758/files/36010095.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlofdr:26758

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.26758

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Food Distribution Research from Food Distribution Research Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().