Empirical Models of Lobbying

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi

Annual Review of Economics, 2020, vol. 12, issue 1, 391-413

Abstract: This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions in both. The two main unresolved methodological issues remain (a) how to account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced and (b) how distorted those equilibrium policies are relative to the social optimum. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of lobbying remains one of the most elusive.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350
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Working Paper: Empirical Models of Lobbying (2019)
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DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350

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