Empirical Models of Lobbying

Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi

No 26287, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within Political Economy. In surveying extant evidence, we emphasize quid-pro-quo and informational issues in special interest politics and we highlight crucial open research questions in both. The main unresolved methodological issues remain how to properly account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced, and on how distorted those equilibrium policies might be relative to the interests of the general public. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the welfare distortions of lobbying remains one of the most elusive

JEL-codes: P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
Note: POL
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Published as Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," Annual Review of Economics, vol 12(1).

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