Worker Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany and Britain
John Addison (),
William Siebert (),
Joachim Wagner () and
Xiangdong Wei ()
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2000, vol. 38, issue 1, 7-48
The Freeman–Lazear works council/worker involvement model is assessed over two distinct industrial relations regimes. In non‐union British establishments our measures of employee involvement are associated with improved economic performance, whereas for unionized plants negative results are detected. The suggestion is that local distributive bargaining can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen. Also consistent with the model is our finding that mandatory works councils do not impair, and may even improve, the performance of larger German establishments. Yet smaller plants with works councils under‐perform, illustrating the problem of tailoring mandates to fit heterogeneous populations.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:38:y:2000:i:1:p:7-48
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0007-1080
Access Statistics for this article
British Journal of Industrial Relations is currently edited by Edmund Heery
More articles in British Journal of Industrial Relations from London School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().