 Performance Pay and Applicant ScreeningUwe Jirjahn and Jens Mohrenweiser British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2019, vol. 57, issue 3, 540-575 Abstract: Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between intensity of individual‐based performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is positively associated with applicant screening. By contrast, in establishments without increased multitasking, performance pay is negatively associated with applicant screening. We do not find a similar pattern of results for group‐based performance pay or profit‐sharing. Our findings fit the hypothesis that individual‐based performance pay induces a positive self‐sorting of employees if jobs are less multifaceted. In this case, employers with a high intensity of performance pay do not need intensive applicant screening to ensure a high quality of matches between workers and jobs. However, if jobs are more multifaceted, individual‐based performance pay can entail problems of adverse self‐sorting. In order to mitigate or overcome these problems, employers making intensive use of performance pay also screen applicants more intensively. Date: 2019 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:57:y:2019:i:3:p:540-575 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article British Journal of Industrial Relations is currently edited by Edmund Heery More articles in British Journal of Industrial Relations from London School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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