Federalism with Bicameralism

Lisa Grazzini and Alessandro Petretto ()

German Economic Review, 2015, vol. 16, issue 2, 138-160

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="geer12046-abs-0001">

We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.

Date: 2015
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Journal Article: Federalism with Bicameralism (2015)
Working Paper: Federalism with Bicameralism (2013)
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German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin

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