Federalism with Bicameralism

Lisa Grazzini and Petretto Alessandro
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Petretto Alessandro: Department of Economics, University of Florence,Florence, Italy

German Economic Review, 2015, vol. 16, issue 2, 138-160

Abstract: We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.

Keywords: Fiscal federalism; median voter; bicameralism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Journal Article: Federalism with Bicameralism (2015)
Working Paper: Federalism with Bicameralism (2013)
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DOI: 10.1111/geer.12046

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