Federalism with Bicameralism

Lisa Grazzini and Alessandro Petretto ()

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: We analyse horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in a federal country with a bicameral national system. We show under which conditions, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national tax rate.

Keywords: Fiscal federalism; Median voter; Bicameralism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Federalism with Bicameralism (2015)
Journal Article: Federalism with Bicameralism (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2013_01.rdf

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