Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler and Alexandra Zaby

German Economic Review, 2017, vol. 18, issue 4, 444-467

Date: 2017
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Journal Article: Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (2017)
Working Paper: Blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining: A theoretical and experimental analysis (2016)
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