Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Manfred Stadler and
Alexandra K. Zaby
German Economic Review, 2017, vol. 18, issue 4, 444-467
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Working Paper: Blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining: A theoretical and experimental analysis (2016)
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