Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Güth Werner, Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler and Alexandra Zaby
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Güth Werner: Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali (LUISS) Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods,Roma, Italy

German Economic Review, 2017, vol. 18, issue 4, 444-467

Abstract: This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.

Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining; information structure; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Related works:
Journal Article: Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (2017)
Working Paper: Blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining: A theoretical and experimental analysis (2016)
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DOI: 10.1111/geer.12112

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