Workplace democracy in the lab
Philip Mellizo,
Jeffrey Carpenter and
Peter Matthews
Industrial Relations Journal, 2014, vol. 45, issue 4, 313-328
Abstract:
While intuition suggests that empowering workers to have some say in the control of the firm is likely to have beneficial effects, empirical evidence of such effects is hard to come by because of numerous confounding factors in the naturally occurring data. We report evidence from a real-effort experiment confirming that worker performance is sensitive to the process used to select the compensation contract. Groups of workers that voted to determine their compensation scheme provided significantly more effort than groups that had no say in how they would be compensated. This effect is robust to controls for the compensation scheme implemented, worker characteristics such as ability and gender, and possible sorting.
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/irj.12054 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Workplace Democracy in the Lab (2011) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indrel:v:45:y:2014:i:4:p:313-328
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0019-8692
Access Statistics for this article
Industrial Relations Journal is currently edited by Peter Nolan
More articles in Industrial Relations Journal from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().