Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

Jed DeVaro, Suman Ghosh and Cindy Zoghi

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2018, vol. 57, issue 3, 389-434

Abstract: We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified non†whites/non†Asians is large, so employers are less likely to inefficiently withhold their promotions. Thus, given prepromotion performance, the extent to which non†whites/non†Asians have lower promotion probabilities decreases when tasks vary more across levels. Racial differences in wage increases at promotion diminish when tasks vary more across levels. Evidence from a single firm's personnel records supports the model's predictions concerning promotion probabilities.

Date: 2018
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