The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme
Eva Van Belle,
Marijke De Couck,
Valentina Di Stasio and
Stijn Baert ()
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2019, vol. 58, issue 2, 251-274
We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor‐market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job‐vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: The Signal of Applying for a Job under a Vacancy Referral Scheme (2018)
Working Paper: The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indres:v:58:y:2019:i:2:p:251-274
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0019-8676
Access Statistics for this article
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society is currently edited by Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter, Steven Raphael and firstname.lastname@example.org
More articles in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().