The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme

Eva Van Belle, Ralf Caers, Marijke De Couck, Valentina Di Stasio and Stijn Baert

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2019, vol. 58, issue 2, 251-274

Abstract: We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor‐market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job‐vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12230

Related works:
Working Paper: The Signal of Applying for a Job under a Vacancy Referral Scheme (2018)
Working Paper: The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indres:v:58:y:2019:i:2:p:251-274

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