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The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds

Pedro Martins

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2019, vol. 58, issue 4, 591-622

Abstract: Employee representatives in firms are a potentially key but not yet studied source of the impact of unions and works councils. Their actions can shape multiple drivers of firm performance, including collective bargaining, strikes, and training. This article examines the impact of union representative mandates by exploiting legal membership thresholds present in many countries. In the case of Portugal, which we examine here, while firms employing up to forty‐nine union members are required to have one union representative; this increases to two (three) union reps for firms with fifty to ninety‐nine (100–199) union members. Drawing on matched employer–employee data on the unionized sector and regression discontinuity methods, we find that a one percentage point increase in the legal union representative/members ratio leads to an increase in firm performance of at least 7 percent. This result generally holds across multiple dimensions of firm performance and appears to be driven by increased training. However, we find no effects of union representatives on firm‐level wages, given the predominance of sectoral collective bargaining.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12248

Related works:
Working Paper: The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds (2018) Downloads
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