Envy and Compassion in Tournaments

Christian Grund and Dirk Sliwka

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2005, vol. 14, issue 1, 187-207

Abstract: Many experiments and field studies indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self‐interest but also care about the well being of others. In this paper, we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion). It turns out that inequity averse agents exert higher efforts than purely self‐interested agents for a given prize structure. Contrary to standard tournament theory, first‐best efforts cannot be implemented when prizes are endogenous. Furthermore, the choice between vertical and lateral promotions is examined and it is shown that inequity costs have to be traded off against losses in human capital.

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (154)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2005.00039.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Envy and Compassion in Tournaments (2002)
Working Paper: Envy and Compassion in Tournaments (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:14:y:2005:i:1:p:187-207

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