Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: Insights from Cournot competition

Joao Correia‐da‐Silva, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili and Joana Pinho
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Joao Correia-da-Silva

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2019, vol. 28, issue 1, 109-124

Abstract: This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multisided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two‐sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of “average‐marginal‐cost‐preserving” mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multisided platforms.

Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12309

Related works:
Working Paper: Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: Insights from Cournot competition (2019)
Working Paper: Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:28:y:2019:i:1:p:109-124

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().