Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition

Joao Correia da silva, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili and Joana Pinho
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Joao Correia-da-Silva

No 18-946, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two-sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of "average-marginal-cost-preserving" mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms.

Keywords: Mergers; Multi-Sided Platforms; Cournot Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: Insights from Cournot competition (2019)
Working Paper: Horizontal mergers between multisided platforms: Insights from Cournot competition (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:32901

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