Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

A. Jorge Padilla, Samuel Bentolila and Juan Dolado

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1996, vol. 5, issue 4, 535-564

Abstract: We develop a game‐theoretic version of the right‐to‐manage model of firm‐level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.

Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00535.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1996)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1994)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1994)
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